25 October 2007

Education of a Coach (not me)

David Halberstam’s Education of a Coach explores the path that Bill Belichick took to reach his position as head coach of the New England Patriots, winners of three Superbowl titles. Influenced by his father, long-time Navy coach Steve Belichick, Bill began breaking down film at a young age -- though he never played football professionally or at a major college, he continued to study the game diligently under coaches such as Ted Marchibroda, Ray Perkins, and Bill Parcells.

An unsuccessful stint coaching the Cleveland Browns interrupted and delayed a meticulously planned rise to the top of his field. Coaching suggestions evidently appear throughout the book - Halberstam chronicles Belichick’s work ethic, the roles technology and innovation have played in the coach’s success, and the personal toll that coaches pay for their careers - but it is in the Cleveland failure where the most salient lessons emerge.

Belichick arrived in town with a detailed plan and a record of achievements as an assistant coach but during his stay with the Browns he was repeatedly thwarted by a meddling Art Moddell. After dealing with Moddell himself, Paul Brown insisted that the other members of the Cincinnati Bengals’ ownership group schedule appointments to meet with him, in order to assert his independence as a coach.

Owners, general managers, athletic directors, and university presidents have all disrupted the best laid plans of coaches over the years, a control that is often present throughout sport. For his second stint as a head coach, it was imperative to Belichick that he seek out an ideal situation, like the one that he found in New England with supportive owner Bob Kraft. Managers who insist that the spotlight focus on themselves or their deeds and believe that they know it all will succeed. Throughout the years, football has remained a team sport and team sports - by name - require that various talents amongst different people blend together to create a respectful, winning, environment.

The initial failure reveals the value of adaptability and the ability to adapt at the at the right time. Quarterback Bernie Kosar was ill-suited to the offensive systems Belichick wished to install and the coach suffered through the poor match for many years. Kosar should have been cut earlier or the system altered from the beginning.

A coach should identify his/her core principles and stick by them. Everything else should be modified according to the situation. Once rules are established, any bending or breaking undermines the coach’s authority. Truly great players, like Lawrence Taylor or Tom Brady, are so rare that Belichick has only encountered two on all the teams he has coached. Devising special rules for every other athlete is simply not worth the cost.

Lastly, Belichick’s career proves that those who receive a second chance can become successful, even after the most spectacular failures. However, whether they are athletes, coaches, or regular people must learn from their mistakes and cannot dare repeat them.

After his dismissal in Cleveland, Belichick waited five year for the ideal head coaching post to become open, even coaching the New York Jets for a day before resigning to take the Patriots job. Once he was hired in Foxboro, he knew it was his last kick at the heat coaching can. Fortunately, Belichick was confident in his abilities, staying true to himself, learning from past mistakes, and ultimately creating a football dynasty.

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11 October 2007

Peut ce qui veut

David Cronenberg’s latest film, Eastern Promises, bears a handful of the director’s trademarks. Some scenes of violence are blunt, though it is not yet time for our William Tell routine. The plot is tense and (obviously) leads to an ambiguous ending. Viggo Mortensen’s tragic hero, Nikolai, earns the sympathy of the audience because of his subdued performance.

Questions of commitment arise from both sides of the ledger: how far will you go to achieve your goals? «Peut ce qui veut.»

Values are vague -- like other recently reviewed films, less separates good and evil than it first seems. One decision might lead down a thorny path that is difficult to escape. What ends justify the means? If the Vory V Zakone are one of the most brutally violent organizations in the world, is there a limit that restricts the methods employed to apprehend the gang?

A number of the principal characters are deeply conflicted. Nothing is black and while: among the shades of grey there are multiple sides to every issue from sexual identity to the value of life.

Or is it all part of a steep price?

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10 October 2007

So What Do You Think You Know?

Two ideas that I have been recently mulling over:

Spin: A three-point shot, released with backspin, is tipped by a defender who is closing out desperately, hands up. The ball, deflected from its intended path, heads towards the short corner. Is the clockwise vector - applied to the bottom of the ball - strong enough to overcome the shooter’s finger flick? Does the ball have any rotation? If so, is it material enough to influence the ball’s trajectory (beyond the linear forces pushing the ball towards and away from the basket)?

If nothing else, the block should augment the ball’s forward bounce when it hits the court, according to specular reflection. Or perhaps a 4,700 sq. ft. piece of hardwood is too small to seriously consider the impact of physics.

Timeouts: The season’s hottest trend is to call timeout just before the opponent attempts a late-game field goal. Scarcely moments before the ball is to be snapped, the coach signals timeout to the side judge, who blows his whistle but cannot stop the play so the kick must be attempted again. Mike Shanahan and Lane Kiffin succeeded; the second kicks were missed and blocked respectively. Dick Jauron failed; the do-over was good and Buffalo lost the game.

How much physical recovery is necessary after the strenuous exertion of a long field goal attempt? Should the offence call a timeout (if they have one) to ensure that the kicker is rested? What about the mental aspect? Does the outcome of the first attempt or perceived feelings of fatigue alter the kicker’s confidence, positively or negatively? Does the defence gain additional insight concerning the offensive line’s blocking schemes?

Or is the late timeout an idle gesture, an ineffective tactical maneuver executed in order to keep up appearances, avoid accusations of coaching like Marty Schottenheimer? Since results count, Shanahan and Kiffin are judged to be right, because if they had done nothing, they would have lost. To me, it’s dubious that these coaches are pulling the strings and altering percentages. What if the first kick went wide right and the place kicker was able to correct his mistake on the second try?

Food for thought. x2.

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08 October 2007

No End in Sight & Shake Hands with the Devil

No End in Sight, a documentary by Charles Ferguson analyzing the United States involvement in Iraq, was released to very little fanfare this past week. The only theatre in town screening the film was the Bloor Cinema on a Friday night.

Ferguson sought to encompass the perspectives of the American decision-makers, tying them to the events that covered the first critical year of the Iraqi occupation in 2003. In many ways, U.S. choices made regarding the Iraq War paralleled British decisions in the Crimean War. In explaining how the entire war has been comprised of one fiasco following another, No End in Sight illustrates several salient lessons regarding leadership.

Lack of Knowledge: those who were making decisions neither understood the political situation in Iraq nor possessed combat or occupation experience. Few members of the Coalition Provisional Authority spoke Arabic, straining communications with Iraqi citizens. The De-Ba’athification policy deprived Iraq of most of those with education who had been working in the country’s administration.

Failure to Adjust: when one plan went array, there was no impetus to make alternate arrangements or modify expectations. Frequently, those who reported that something didn’t work out as planned were fired. Prejudices guided decisions, such as expensive contracts awarded to U.S. based companies when local groups were completing the same projects using less resources.

Communication: decisions were made in Washington and from behind the walls of the Green Zone, reflecting a disconnection between allied troops and their commanders. Many in the U.S. Armed Forces resented the decision-makers due to their lack of experience and the belief that they were not entirely truthful.

Poor Planning: the U.S. government did not devote enough time to planning the post-war occupation. Key information was ignored and not considered when creating the blueprints of the post-Saddam Iraq. The Armed Forces sent roughly half the number of troops required; consequently looting abounded, key structures - ranging from the National Museum to government buildings - were demolished, and ceaseless violence turned most Iraqi citizens against their occupiers.

Shake Hands with the Devil, the film adaptation of General Roméo Dallaire’s book describes how international leadership breakdowns led to the genocide in Rwanda in the 1990s. In contrast to No End, this film is based on a single point of view. Whilst the film demonstrates how numerous soldiers were affected by the atrocities, the main theme is one man’s struggles to balance his job with his values, trying to do whatever he can to save lives despite operational constraints imposed by his superiors.

The single perspective of Roméo Dallaire is the film’s strong point and weak link. Roy Dupuis appears in nearly every scene and the audience connects sympathizes with him. However, Dupuis’ performance is at times wooden. Questions arise as to whether the film is entirely accurate, especially with regards to accusations of French complicity in the affair.

The film is very disjointed, jumping from one incident to another. On one hand, it suits the chaotic nature of the hundred days of the genocide. On the other, it prevents deeper investigation of specific incidents.

Scenes in a therapist’s office symbolize the regret Dallaire feels because he was forced to ignore evidence proving that militants were acquiring weapons. Furthermore, the Rwandan Prime Minister was assassinated under the “protection” of United Nations peacekeepers unable to fire on her attackers.

Leading by Example: The protagonist models the way for the troops under his command. A lynchpin of Dallaire’s leadership is his devotion to those who serve with him and those whom he feels responsible to protect. He is also creative, devising outside the box, such as “exchanges” of non-combatants, to solve crucial problems.

Resources:
It seems that the U.N. mission is crippled by a lack of resources, from troops to ammunition. The international community spends so much time arguing over terminology that Dallaire cannot even conduct basic operations in attempt to prevent the genocide. Like Iraq, the ultimate decision-makers handcuff the troops on the ground with their inaction.

Those who Forget History…: Like the Middle East, Rwanda was a country were the ethnic divisions - between Hutus and Tutsis - were created and heightened by European powers, in this case Belgian colonials.

Both situations in Iraq and Rwanda reach a degree of absurdity, characterized by a scene in Shake Hands were Dallaire is kicking a can in an open area, amid threats of sniper fire. An armed militia member appears, asking the U.N. forces present if they members of “Dallaire’s Gang”, announcing that he will kill the general if he sees him. Dallaire introduces himself and the two shake hands. The militia member walks off, unsure of what to do next.

Some of the events across the globe, from Yugoslavia to Darfur to Somalia to Iraq to Rwanda are so violent that the indifference of international observers is best described by absurdist metaphors. General Dallaire and other soldiers are so deeply influenced by what they witnessed that they can’t leave it behind, inching forward, one day at a time.

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03 October 2007

The Reason Why

The Charge of the Light Brigade
Lord Alfred Tennyson

Cecil Woodham-Smith wrote The Reason Why to document the circumstances that led to one of the most disastrous military ventures in history: the Charge of the Light Brigade during the Crimean War. I read it on the recommendation of David Halberstam, who said it made history come alive for him, and found it to be an excellent metaphor for leadership - in any field.

1. Half a league, half a league,
Half a league onward,
All in the valley of Death
Rode the six hundred.
“Forward, the Light Brigade!
“Charge for the guns!” he said:
Into the valley of Death
Rode the six hundred.

First and foremost, the British system of purchasing commissions led to the ill-fated Charge. Undeserved promotions were given to those who could afford to pay the most, instead of those who were the best qualified. The British generals, Lord Raglan, Lord Lucan, and Lord Cardigan, were wholly incompetent and had a deeply dysfunctional working relationship, leading to a stream of horrendous decisions.

During their careers, especially Cardigan’s tenure in the army, countless skilled soldiers left their regiments or faced court marshal. The three also looked upon officers who had served overseas with contempt, scorning their expertise and the information that they provided.

Pragmatic, accurate evaluation of talent would have put the right people in the right places. An open mind would have allowed the generals to use all of their resources to their fullest potential.

2. “Forward, the Light Brigade!”
Was there a man dismay’d?
Not tho’ the soldier knew
Someone had blunder’d:
Their’s not to make reply,
Their’s not to reason why,
Their’s but to do and die:
Into the valley of Death
Rode the six hundred.

Few British troops sought to take responsibility for the Charge and other failures earlier in the Crimean War, rather pointing the fingers at each other and casting blame. Consequently, there was a fair amount of resentment among the officers, rather than respect. Soldiers did not understand decisions made by their commanding officers, a disconnection that fuelled a poisonous environment.

3. Cannon to right of them,
Cannon to left of them,
Cannon in front of them
Volley’d and thunder’d;
Storm’d at with shot and shell,
Boldly they rode and well,
Into the jaws of Death,
Into the mouth of Hell
Rode the six hundred.

Commanders micro-managed to excess, focusing on details like uniform trim or precise formations on the battlefield. Troops died of exposure and others were weakened as a result of spending nights outside, in formation. The brisk weather of the Balkans was perfectly suited to an adjustment in British tactics. The big picture - winning the Crimean War - was not nearly as important as looking good whilst doing so.

Jon Gruden, Lane Kiffin, and numerous other coaches devote too much time sweating the little things. The main objective of statistics is to identify what factors are closely tied to success on the field so that the most time and resources can be apportioned towards those key areas.

4. Flash’d all their sabres bare,
Flash’d as they turn’d in air,
Sabring the gunners there,
Charging an army, while
All the world wonder’d:
Plunged in the battery-smoke
Right thro’ the line they broke;
Cossack and Russian
Reel’d from the sabre stroke
Shatter’d and sunder’d.
Then they rode back, but not
Not the six hundred.

The British were quite arrogant while preparing for the Crimean War, underestimating the size and skill of their Russian opponents and the commitment required to achieve victory. They were also unaware of specific troop movements and reinforcements throughout the conflict. Better information would have resulted in better decisions.

5. Cannon to right of them,
Cannon to left of them,
Cannon behind them
Volley’d and thunder’d;
Storm’d at with shot and shell,
While horse and hero fell,
They that had fought so well
Came thro’ the jaws of Death
Back from the mouth of Hell,
All that was left of them,
Left of six hundred.

Flexibility is a leadership attribute often derided. Politicians who adjust their policies are deemed to have “flip-flopped” but isn’t adapting one’s strategy to changing circumstances a sign of best practices? It’s certainly the main objective of timeouts and the half-time intermission.

The British army did not utilize all available information because intelligence was ignored due to the prejudices of the aristocratic commanders towards their Turkish and “Indian” soldiers. Had any of those commanders considered the reports from the field earnestly or thought to alter their tactics to better suit fighting in the Crimea, the Battle of Balaclava would have resulted in an opposite outcome.

In military disasters throughout history, intransigence and a refusal to recognize change have led to countless casualties that could have been prevented.

6. When can their glory fade?
O the wild charge they made!
All the world wondered.
Honor the charge they made,
Honor the Light Brigade,
Noble six hundred.

The author, Woodham-Smith, feels that the loss of the Light Brigade inspired the United Kingdom to modernize their armed forces. Most notably, service academics improved the expertise and experience of officers whilst innovation and technology brought the army into the twentieth century. Often, a complete calamity, such as the Battle of Balaclava, a bankruptcy, a blowout on the court, or the New York Mets’ 2007 September collapse is the perfect time to re-evaluate every aspect of an operation in the name of progress.

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01 October 2007

3:10 to Yuma

Compared to other western films that I have screened recently, 3:10 to Yuma compares quite favourably. I thought that it is one of the best films that I have seen this year. Like The Assassination of Jesse James by the Coward Robert Ford, it explores the life of a Wild West outlaw who has reached the end of the road and must change their direction. Unlike Jesse James, it doesn’t drag endlessly and offers a tense and surprising conclusion.

3:10 to Yuma is driven by its lead characters, Dan Evans (Christian Bale) and Ben Wade (Russell Crowe) who initially represent complete opposites: good and evil. As they interact throughout the film, they discover that they are more similar than they thought. Their morals are not black and white but different shades of grey. Also, as they learn more about each other, they begin to respect their counterpart and see his perspective.

Due to its almost mythological history, the Wild West is an excellent setting the explore duality and multiple personalities. Outlaws and sheriffs are equally legendary. No character on the silver screen or person in the real world is entirely consistent with one particular trait and everyone makes both good and bad decisions. In this regard, I found the film to be most similar to The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly. Like the Man with No Name trilogy, 3:10 to Yuma also provided an enjoyable mix of action and dialogue, drama and comedy.

Second chances also abound for the protagonists. Dan Evans regrets his service in the Civil War and seeks to regain the respect of his eldest son and Ben Wade is trying to discern meaning, beyond wealth and violence, in the world. Both redeem themselves to some extent on the trip to Contention where Wade is to catch a train to Yuma prison.

Highly recommended.

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