15 April 2008

Sport in Canadian Society

The anthology, Sport in Canadian Society, contains theses about gender, violence, class, and other issues in sport. Although published in 1991, the chapter regarding media remains very salient. The authors believe that broadcasting sporting events can lead to a slippery slope wherein ratings influence telecasts in many ways. For example, a legitimate sport like skiing could be replaced by a dilatory exhibition like arm wrestling on A.B.C.’s Wide World of Sports or commentators might go beyond describing the action and actually create their own storylines. Competing for viewers, the networks distort the competition more and more, in order to create a product that appeals to more viewers.

Watching yesterday’s Raptors-Heat game, I couldn’t help but feel that the game was irrelevant. Spurious activities abounded: the mascot held up placards during play, Rasho Nesterovic was digitally inserted into Saturday Night Fever, and many fans missed the first few possessions of each quarter because they were getting food. Association basketball is tepid and rarely engaging for a full forty-eight minutes. So I watch the weak-side, the trail official, or the post play.

It’s difficult to focus on the weak-side because the Air Canada Centre is excessively loud. It’s much more serene to watch at home but given the attendance figures, Serenity Now is not what the fans want. Instead of educating spectators about the game, teams in the Association have changed the experience to create a noisy, abrasive, and overwhelming experience. For many people, the competition is secondary to whether they can take home a mediocre slice of pizza (too often after a mediocre game.)

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11 April 2008

Best Seat in the House

Spike Lee’s “basketball memoir”, Best Seat in the House, provides a unique perspective on the sport and frank commentary. Despite his film background, Lee is tremendously knowledgeable about basketball and how it is intertwined with New York City’s culture.

He has attended hundreds of games, from Game 7 of the 1970 Finals when Willis Reed emerged from the locker room to deflate and defeat the Lakers to Game 7 of the 1994 Eastern Finals when the Knicks returned to the Finals for the first time in twenty years, and he describes the city’s euphoric reaction to these moments. Thousands of citizens, young and old, play ball - few succeeded in the Association while most few short - and they (wrongly) indentify themselves with the sport.

Lee comments on the role that psychology played in Michael Jordan’s career. Jordan always had an edge over his opponents, gained by repeatedly owning them on the court while befriending them off of it, and he would not hesitate to take advantage. To him, winning was paramount. Jeff Van Gundy called Jordan a “con-man” (and the Knicks were subsequently lit up [repeatedly]) but Lee admired this tactic, despite what Chicago did to the Knicks over the years.

Lee also discusses how General Managers do not pay enough attention to a free agent’s environment while tripping over each other in order to sign the latest superstar. Salaries are spiralling out of control but nobody asks “why is that guy so good?” or “who made that team so great?” in enough detail. Consequently, players like Larry Brown (1996 Dallas Cowboys) and Troy Glaus (2002 Anaheim Angels) sign huge deals and never duplicate their performance because the players who protected them are no longer around.

Legends were interviewed and said that modern players possess a sense of entitlement. George Gervin claimed that they wouldn’t take anyone’s advice, from college and professional coaches to former players, and few reached their potential. Others, like Bill Bradley, commented that overall skill and team play have disappeared as players become more one-dimensional. Michael Jordan never stopped listening to Dean Smith and Phil Jackson and continued to improve. The Association may have become bigger and better over the past twenty years but the level of play has not followed suit.

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09 April 2008

Clutch Performance

According to a study of collegiate basketball, the two statistics most correlated with winning are field goal percentage and free throws attempted. During Monday’s N.C.A.A. Final, Kansas made 53% of their shots, Memphis shot nineteen foul shots, and the Jayhawks won 75-68 in overtime. The game was close enough that a number of plays could have altered the outcome. Why did Kansas win?

A student said that the result wasn’t fair, that the Tigers only lost because Derrick Rose performed below his normal standards. The reason that Rose shot poorly and went scoreless for so long was the Jayhawks’ defensive pressure: Bill Self alternated between man-to-man with Brandon Rush on Rose, a trapping 2-3, and a box-and-1 (Mario Chalmers guarded Chris Douglas-Roberts). Team defence held Memphis to a dozen points below their average. The 2008 Title Game will become a legendary game because strategy neutralized superior individual talent, like Rick Majerus’ triangle-and-2 versus Arizona ten years ago.

A clutch performer is one who performs consistently during close games. A player who shoots fifty percent would be considered a clutch performer if they made one out of two shots when the game was on the line.

Kansas should be considered clutch performers because they performed as they did all year, for the most part. Down the stretch, Memphis’ defensive stats, such as points per possession, deflections, and stops, plummeted. Did the Tigers choke?

A subjective measure would be to evaluate technique. Irrespective of whether the shot went in, did they use the same technique as they did in previous games and practices. At the line, Memphis seemed uneasy and pulled away from the hoop. Likewise, Kansas appeared soft while boxing out in the final minutes and getting additional stops complicated the comeback attempt.

When Memphis was up 60-51 with two minutes remaining, they likely held a 95% chance or winning (or more). Tigers’ foul shooting - a blight all year – finally caught up to them as they made only three of seven shots down the stretch. But, considering the entire game, Memphis performed at their season average. The term clutch performance is so nebulous because results are totally different depending on the length of the time period considered.

In short, there isn’t any answer because sample size is too small. Mario Chalmers sent the game to overtime with a very difficult three point attempt that he might only make once for every five tries. Memphis used questionable clock management but since they played few close games they hadn’t had the chance to practice that skill (but they should have). And they should have practiced foul shots.

There’s a reason coaches insist that players work on that shot. I record every free throw taken in practice in order to evaluate players. Dean Smith believes that foul shooting is the one true individual stat in practice.

Individual Tigers didn’t work on this skill enough during the year and coach John Calipari erred by not making free throw shooting a point of emphasis until it improved beyond sixty percent. Kansas matched Memphis’ athleticism so the game came down to individual skills. Bill Self told his team that they’ll be reminded of this game for the rest of their lives and Memphis will remember their choices and lack of practice at the line.

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