I Wrote this While Waiting in the Airport

Like 1999, the Toronto Raptors have made a draft-day deal, exchanging their draft pick for a big from the Indiana Pacers. Like 1999, a (relatively) new General Manager is hoping that this is the move that helps the Raptors exchange their “Participant” ribbons from the past two years for real playoff glory. Trading the seventeenth pick, Rasho Nesterovic, T.J. Ford, and likely Maceo Baston for Jermaine O’Neal should do the trick.

Rasho is fundamentally sound, defends reasonably well, cares for the team, and is a nice guy … but there are also reasons why he’s always the second or third best big in his draft year, his free agent year, or most of the deals he has been involved with. He lacks athleticism and dominant post moves. No qualms with Rasho’s toughness but he doesn’t demand a double-team and won’t take over games in the fourth quarter.

T.J. Ford needed to go, sooner rather than later. Despite all of his positives, Ford’s injury risks balance with O’Neal’s concerns. Ford was also destroying the team’s chemistry and making this trade now allows Colangelo to firmly commit to Jose Calderon. With any luck, Colangelo will also commit to someone who can teach Calderon how to handle a double-team during the screen and roll and penetrate and kick against a large centre; foiling Tom Thibodeau and Dwight Howard should be two of his main goals this year.

Jermaine O’Neal is a great fit for the Raptors although the $44M contract over two years is not so good. Chris Bosh likes to work from the wing or the high post and O’Neal should complement him inside. He will be an excellent option on the block down the stretch of games and will be double-teamed, opening room for Jason Kapono, Anthony Parker, and Carlos Delfino. And O’Neal will post an enormous “Stay Out” sign near Toronto’s basket.

The Raptors must decide whether to start Kapono, Delfino, Jamario Moon, or Andrea Bargnani at the 3. I think that Kapono will be the best fit, as his shooting will benefit tremendously from the Raptors’ inside presence. But Sam Mitchell will have options down the stretch. Bargnani should come off the bench as the sixth man, also as the first forward back-up, until he proves he deserves otherwise and Delfino should back-up the guards.

Colangelo needs a P.J. Brown/Udonis Haslem/Nazr Mohammed-type to fill a forward spot in the rotation (unless Primo Brezec or Kris Humphries show that they have improved) and should use the mid-level exception to fill this role. Or he could split the mid-level and also sign the back-up point guard required, since Darrick Martin won’t do this year. Jamario could get some burn, but it’s imperative that he attack the rack much more. Under this scenario (two players remaining to be signed), Joey Graham is expendable but he might be the twelfth player on the roster.

Of course, O’Neal’s knee could still be problematic, Bosh’s plantar fasciitis might flare up, and Calderon could be horrendously injured at the Beijing Olympics. Irrespective of all of those possibilities, I think the deal will work. Toronto will not surpass Boston as the Atlantic Division Champion but they have a good shot at the fourth seed in the playoffs and they should take care of the Orlando Magic if they meet again in the post-season.

(Kidney issues aside, if I were Bryan Colangelo, I would have spent picks 25 or 26 trying to trade-up and get Darrell Arthur because I think he’s a nice fit for the bench or picks 28 to 33 trying to get Mario Chalmers for that back-up point spot.)

Clutch Performance

According to a study of collegiate basketball, the two statistics most correlated with winning are field goal percentage and free throws attempted. During Monday’s N.C.A.A. Final, Kansas made 53% of their shots, Memphis shot nineteen foul shots, and the Jayhawks won 75-68 in overtime. The game was close enough that a number of plays could have altered the outcome. Why did Kansas win?

A student said that the result wasn’t fair, that the Tigers only lost because Derrick Rose performed below his normal standards. The reason that Rose shot poorly and went scoreless for so long was the Jayhawks’ defensive pressure: Bill Self alternated between man-to-man with Brandon Rush on Rose, a trapping 2-3, and a box-and-1 (Mario Chalmers guarded Chris Douglas-Roberts). Team defence held Memphis to a dozen points below their average. The 2008 Title Game will become a legendary game because strategy neutralized superior individual talent, like Rick Majerus’ triangle-and-2 versus Arizona ten years ago.

A clutch performer is one who performs consistently during close games. A player who shoots fifty percent would be considered a clutch performer if they made one out of two shots when the game was on the line.

Kansas should be considered clutch performers because they performed as they did all year, for the most part. Down the stretch, Memphis’ defensive stats, such as points per possession, deflections, and stops, plummeted. Did the Tigers choke?

A subjective measure would be to evaluate technique. Irrespective of whether the shot went in, did they use the same technique as they did in previous games and practices. At the line, Memphis seemed uneasy and pulled away from the hoop. Likewise, Kansas appeared soft while boxing out in the final minutes and getting additional stops complicated the comeback attempt.

When Memphis was up 60-51 with two minutes remaining, they likely held a 95% chance or winning (or more). Tigers’ foul shooting - a blight all year – finally caught up to them as they made only three of seven shots down the stretch. But, considering the entire game, Memphis performed at their season average. The term clutch performance is so nebulous because results are totally different depending on the length of the time period considered.

In short, there isn’t any answer because sample size is too small. Mario Chalmers sent the game to overtime with a very difficult three point attempt that he might only make once for every five tries. Memphis used questionable clock management but since they played few close games they hadn’t had the chance to practice that skill (but they should have). And they should have practiced foul shots.

There’s a reason coaches insist that players work on that shot. I record every free throw taken in practice in order to evaluate players. Dean Smith believes that foul shooting is the one true individual stat in practice.

Individual Tigers didn’t work on this skill enough during the year and coach John Calipari erred by not making free throw shooting a point of emphasis until it improved beyond sixty percent. Kansas matched Memphis’ athleticism so the game came down to individual skills. Bill Self told his team that they’ll be reminded of this game for the rest of their lives and Memphis will remember their choices and lack of practice at the line.

"Il Mago"

Lately criticism has abounded concerning Raptors forward AndreaBargnani, initially justified, now provided by columnists seeking topics, attempting to feed a need. Evaluating Bargnani is challenging, on account of several injuries affecting his performance since late last season. Foot and knee injuries have deprived “Il Mago” of his quickness and first step. The first months of his career had been promising and raised everyone’s expectations.

Now, the knives are out. But anyone who writes off a draft pick in their second year is asking to become a victim of other general managers, ignoring the precedent set by Steve Nash, Dirk Nowitzki, and Kevin Garnett, the last three M.V.P. winners who struggled mightily during their second seasons.

Obviously, Bargnani is not at this level - the entire draft class was considered weak at the time - but pundits have been disappointed by a range of talents, from Tracy McGrady to Kwame Brown, so any number of paths are possible.

Andrea Bargnani stated the Raptors’ first few games of 07-08, playing a quasi-Euro centre next to Chris Bosh’s power forward. After a number of underwhelming performances, he was bench in favour of Rasho Nesterovic and coach Sam Mitchell has inconsistently dispersed minutes since. Now, as of Saturday’s game in Phoenix, the Italian is back in the starting lineup, apparently to stay.

Nesterovic is a vastly underrated defender who possesses an array of post moves. Despite occasionally poor shot selection, he deserves to start in the Association. Toronto will suffer if he continues to be DNP-CDed. Bargnani could become stronger but if he followed Nesterovic’s example of persistence he would immediately become a better defender. Adding more inside post moves to his game would allow him to become more like Arvydas Sabonis, and other players who combined inside and outside games.

Starting again as Toronto’s centre, Bargnani performed much better in his increased role. In addition to improving his ability to defend, he could develop his decisiveness and confidence in order to play with more aggressiveness, draw fouls, and shoot higher percentage shots. Few possess Bargnani’s skill set but it is meaningless if he doesn’t use it to the fullest extent.

Jamario Moon should be benched in favour of Bargnani. Certainly, Moon’s “joie de jouer” and vertical leap have endeared him to Toronto fans but he performs inconsistently and if anyone should give up minutes, it is him.

Currently, Moon’s main flaw is a tendency to force outside shots and avoid driving to the basket to force contact. This is similar to what Bargnani should improve so if he doesn’t want to play with more intensity, Moon should continue to receive the benefit of the doubt. But Jamario Moon does not need to play forty minutes per game so there is certainly room to scale back his burn.

This decision is slightly complicated by Toronto’s system, which works best when sparked by the defence. The offence struggles the most when the players (Jason Kapono, Carlos Delfino, T.J. Ford) jack bad outside shots. The last thing the Raptors need is more weak defence and outside shooting. Attacking the basket, posting up, cutting, sharing the ball, making reasonable outside shots: all attributes of Bargnani’s that can jumpstart the Raptor’s motion offence -- if he wants to.

Occam's Razor

In two of their last three games, the Toronto Raptors have come from behind in the second half. The final result belying severe offensive difficulties, the stark contrast in first and second half performances providing a virtual manual regarding how to win basketball games. Truly it’s no mystery.

For example, the Raptors took too many jumpers early in last night’s game with the Los Angeles Clippers. If Tim Thomas were guarding me, I would post him up. When Chris Bosh realized this and began attacking the basket, he began scoring, going to the line, and drawing the double-time. A rocker-step - a tremendous post move - wastes possessions eighteen feet away from the hoop.

Clippers Centre Chris Kaman was destroying Toronto’s interior defense until Rasho Nesterovic commenced fighting him for every inch of the pain. Kaman was forced to start post moves further away from the basket, two dribble moves yielding worse shots than a seal followed by a drop-step. Kaman was also exhausted after the third quarter and noticeably less effective. When pressured, Los Angeles threw atrocious post entry passes.

Friday against the Indiana Pacers, the Raptors’ defence permitted excessive high percentage shots, only to clamp down in the second half. Teams that get ahead early stay ahead more often than not and comeback wins are misleading exceptions. An opponent scoring ceaselessly is combated by remaining discipline and taking good shots. The best pressure defence is to score often. When someone like Mike Dunleavy is going off, attacking him at the other end, like Toronto did with Jason Kapono and Carlos Delfino, often proves to be a successful course of action.

“Plurality ought never be posited without necessity.”
- William of Ockham

Take Initiative

Sam Mitchell and the Toronto Raptors let the Phoenix Suns take a 139-123 victory last night. Earlier in the day, Mitchell boasted in the Fan 590’s morning show that the team had three ways to stop Steve Nash and the Suns.

None of them worked.

Help Defence

José Calderon - and later Anthony Parker - guarded Nash relatively well. But the double-team to stop dribble penetration was disastrous, leaving deadly shooters like Leandro Barbosa open to make three pointers all night. Phoenix is tough to defend because every player possesses unique weapons. Perhaps Grant Hill is the best starter to leave open since he shoots triples so rarely but surely someone could have defended Barbosa after he dropped twenty-two in the first half.

Screen and Roll Defence

The Raptors switched screens - creating openings upon which the Suns immediately capitalized, such as when Amare Stoudamire threw down an alley-oop dunk on T.J. Ford. Other times the team rotated well, three players switching and forcing a bad shot; exaples of the persistent defence that could have won the game if it were more consistent.

Substitution Pattern

Jamario Moon played the first three quarters, then sat for a few minutes, playing a few more minutes before the benches were finally cleared. To me, that’s an illogical rotation. If a player receives that many minutes to start the game, they should be good enough to play the fourth quarter. Moon changed several shots and totally owned Shawn Marion on a block but his thirty-nine minutes were perplexing.

I believe in planning substitutions ahead of time: taking advantage of the fact that daily practices provide a larger sample size than one quarter, keeping track of good combinations and team chemistry, and avoiding incidents were a player might be forgotten.

Lastly, Kris Humphries played fourteen minutes when he should have been riding the pine. Humphries is not skilled enough to compete with Phoenix for an entire game (he did go off for a couple of possessions after his technical foul) and was responsible for many ill-timed switches.

Three Strategies to Consider for the Next Time

The Raptors should have attacked their opponents. They did not generate enough offensive pressure to affect what Phoenix did at the other end. The one successful element that Toronto possessed that the Suns (sans Kurt Thomas) could not handle was Rasho Nesterovic inside. After a strong first half, they ignored the Slovenian and his ornate post offence, attempting to play a second rate version of the PHX game.

Carlos Delfino and Jason Kapono missed countless shots too. Had Toronto played a screen and roll game with Calderon and Nesterovic, they would have generated countless pull-up Js, post-moves, and open threes for Anthony Parker.

From the opening tip, basketball teams have to come out and take the victory. Accentuating strengths, playing physically, and showing confidence combine for victories, now and in April, May, and June. The Raptors played passively, allowing the Suns to control everything. How many times do you shoot 55%, score 123 points, and lose?

Never (if you play great transition D).

On the subject of Phoenix and San Antonio’s Game 5, Specifically

Bruce Bowen Drills Baseline Threes: So do Morris Peterson, Joe Johnson, and Donyell Marshall. Given how awkward Bowen is from the wing or the top of the key, he must shoot very well from corner in order to maintain his 38% overall three point percentage. In fact, the baseline three Bowen attempted in the last minute of Game 5 provided the Spurs with a higher expected point value (1.26) than had any of the other four players on the court attempted a two-point field goal (1.04).

Mike D’Antoni Occasionally Mismanages His Rotation: The Suns largely played six players, in light of the suspensions to Amare Stoudemire and Boris Diaw. Defensively, Phoenix conceded some open looks or fouled unnecessarily. Offensively, there were some atrocious possessions were Steve Nash dribbled endlessly into the defence while shooters and cutters stood still. At both ends of the court, it seems like fatigue contributed to questionable decisions.

The go-ahead three-pointer succeeded because San Antonio moved the ball away from the defence and Nash could not get to Bowen in time. I propose that if the Suns had played a deeper rotation, using Marcus Banks to spell the guards briefly and Jalen Rose to carry some of the scoring load, they would have had more energy for defence during the Spurs decisive run

The Suns Work Very Hard on Defence but their Execution Is Sometimes Lacking: Phoenix should have doubled the post entry to Tim Duncan and left Tony Parker open outside the arc, as they did. Parker was the best option out of a set of bad choices for the Suns: Manu Ginobli was en fuego, Michael Finley was draining shots from the line of 45º - when he passed on his shot, he was swinging it swiftly to Bowen in the corner - and Duncan and Parker were consistent as usual.

Why did Leandro Barbosa make such a looping turn after the ball left the double-team? The fastest guy on the court could only recover to Parker and box him out in the Russian Spot during the shot. Maybe he could have reached Bowen if he had more energy. How did James Jones, guarding Finley, get awkwardly tangled up in the strong-side with Barbosa? If Raja Bell and Nash had not played 47 and 46 minutes respectively, could they have run and jumped Parker’s penetration better? Could Nash have closed out Bowen effectively with fresher legs?

It will never be known whether the Suns too tired to close out correctly down the stretch or if they were unaware of where the San Antonio threats were positioned during the critical play.

It’s Important to Mentally Prepare for End-Game Situations: D’Antoni should have given more thought to the rotation after the initial double. It was highly probable that Parker would penetrate after receiving the pass. Had Bell plugged the foul line, Nash quickly stepped up to Ginobli, and Barbosa switched to Bowen, I think they could have prevented Parker from getting to the rim, Ginobli and Finley from shooting, and gotten to Bowen in time to change his shot, Barbosa’s physical limitations aside.

Many complicated issues would have arisen. Shawn Marion would have probably bared the onus of stopping Duncan one-on-one in a low shot clock situation. Duncan tough to stop on the block and may have gone to the line. All five Suns would have to box out. All things considered, I think that that scenario yields an expected point value of 1.02, although that figure is more art than science.

Three Lessons from Red Holzman

Red Holzman coached the New York Knicks during the 1970s, an era when the team won two Association titles. Knicks players included Walt Frazier, Bill Bradley, Willis Reed, and Earl Monroe - among others - and they were one of the first squads to utilize pressure defence throughout the entire game. The team is also fascinating because a number of very intelligent players executed a motion offence selflessly and because of Willis Reed’s comeback in Game 7 of the 1970 Finals. It seems like everyone on the team wrote books so naturally the coach has written four, of which I read two: Defense! Defense! and Red on Red.

One of the books’ most attractive traits is Holzman’s frank commentary, using real players and teams to describe real systems and situations. The realism enhances the books, which contain many intriguing coaching ideas, such as:

Using Film to Study the Opponents: Holzman was one of the first coaches to review tapes when scouting. Knicks coaches held private film study sessions with individual players and optional team sessions before games, often screening game tape in the locker room as players dressed. This proved to be very influential, as the role of technology in sports has increased exponentially since.

Holzman also made use of a scouting network, similar to what Red Auerbach did with the Celtics, to evaluate players. At the time, many coaches did not devote much time to scouting, a field that has become an entire industry today.

Handling Pressure: Holzman adopted a casual attitude when dealing with officials, the media, and other influences in the Association. “Final is final,” he would say when he explained how he would deal with a tough loss or a bad call. It’s not that he abandoned his team on the court or didn’t reflect upon games afterwards but he had played enough basketball over the years to know not to dwell on one particular moment.

Teaching Players to Think: The Knicks were fortunate to have many smart players, like Bradley, Reed, Jerry Lucas, and Dave DeBusschere who put a great deal of thought into their games. The coaches encouraged this by allowing players to make suggestions that were honestly considered. For example, after Willis Reed suffered a hip injury in Game 5 of the 1970 Finals, Bill Bradley proposed that New York use a 1-3-1 set with him in the pivot (perhaps inspired by Princeton) to draw Wilt Chamberlain away from the basket. The Knicks came back to win that game and the series.

The Knicks also structured their offence to allow for opportunities to read and so that players could use their mental skills in two-man and three-man situations. As a result of the unique collection of basketball I.Q., the seven players from the rotation and the coach of the 1972-73 Association champions have been elected to the Basketball Hall of Fame.

The Basketball Gods

Tex Winter says that a team must pay tribute to the basketball gods in order to succeed, his metaphor to inspire players to practice solid fundamentals and teamwork. According to the 1958 National Coach of the Year, the team that executes at both ends of floor the best will be rewarded.

Fortunately, I was coaching a team that was able to benefit from this today, directly and indirectly. Directly because poise and control resulted in quality scoring chances and defensive pressure produced turnovers and indirectly because fate assessed the opponent with a bizarre technical foul when a player removed their jersey on the bench.

The team could thank Tex for his figure of speech and his offence. First of all, the players deserve all of the credit for their win, a thirteen point comeback in the final minutes of the game and an overtime win. When they focused their determination by playing hard, playing smart, and playing together, the momentum shifted entirely. Secondly, switching to the old reliable offence - the sideline triangle - created opportunities for selfless passing and dribble penetration, which led to excellent shot selection.

Unlike the last overtime game, I stayed out of the way and allowed the team to play. It was satisfying to see every player contribute and to be involved in a game that told a fascinating story. I kept it simple, emphasized our strengths, and other intervened when specific situations permitted me to give the team and advantage. The basketball gods rewarded everyone’s effort with a result that was a polar opposite of the last time.

This isn’t the first time that Tex or the basketball gods have saved me. Tex’s insightful work is timeless, as illustrated by his travels from Kansas State to Chicago to Los Angeles. The basketball gods are not demanding in terms of quantity (or complexity) but are very particular regarding quality.

Watching the Association on ESPN

"How can you give up a wide open three followed by an offensive rebound on the other side of the court?"
- Bill Walton, during the Spurs-Rockets game on 24 January 2007

Team defence is getting worse and worse in the Association and beyond. Conversely it seems like the screen and roll play is getting better and better.

Inbounding under their basket with few seconds remaining on the shot clock, the Spurs set a double screen for Ginobli on the foul line. Ginobli curled the screen, received a pass, and made the lay-up.

Earlier in the evening, Marion set a ballscreen for Nash in the corner. While the two defenders converged on the ballhandler, the Matrix rolled to the hoop, received a pass, and made the lay-up.

Both times, one could ask: "where's the help?" Even if the screener's defenders are caught up, help-side positioning and communication should prevent the easy basket. These principles could have enabled the Rockets to box-out Elson properly and earn praise from Bill Walton instead of scorn.

"Excellence is doing a common thing uncommonly well."
- Booker T. Washington

Inevitably - irrespective of the quality of the defence - it is execution of the little things that contributes of the success of the offence. Phoenix keeps it real, leading the league in transition baskets, slipping the screen, and pull-up jumpers. Coaches can lose their teams (and often themselves) when basketball becomes too complicated.

Many teams just suck at one end of the court. Emphasizing the basics leads to improvement. Rob Smart at Queen's has been doing a good job in this regard. The Golden Gaels' offence is a series of downscreens run for forty minutes. San Antonio ran something similar for Ginobli and Bowen. The teams execute, talk, and read, taking the opportunities the defence provides.