Why We Make Mistakes

Why We Make Mistakes provides anecdotal evidence about why humans repeatedly commit the same common errors. The books is written like a concise summary of Malcolm Gladwell’s Blink and Outliers books that imparts more information in less words.

The book outlines countless ways that someone can make a bad decision, from drivers to surgeons. There is no universal remedy to reduce blunders but overconfidence and a failure to understand and make use of feedback were consistent among multiple missteps. The old adage repeated by Winston Churchill seems to be appropriate: “Those that fail to learn from history, are doomed to repeat it.”

Building upon Gladwell’s books, author Joe Hallinan writes that it is not simply enough to complete 10,000 hours of an activity, one must intelligently analyze their performance and learn what could be improved. When acting quickly, humans should be aware that brains process information according to previously established paradigms: we see what we expect to see. Keeping an open mind and adjusting to the situation can reduce oversights.

Malcolm Gladwell and Full-Court Pressure

A friend asked me to comment on this article, which was published by Malcolm Gladwell in the New Yorker.

First of all, Vivek Ranadivé is incredibly self-centered and should reevaluate why he wants to coach twelve-year-old girls. This statement does not absolve his counterparts of their boorish, loutish, and short-tempered behaviour but he is coaching at the wrong level. Usually, that particular age group restricts full-court pressure because of the destructive effects on skill development. If he had limited practice time, Randivé should have focused on fundamental skills.
Obviously full-court pressure would work; most teenagers make horrendous decisions under any type of pressure. It’s entirely different when rick Pitino does likewise at the University of Louisville because of the difference in skill level and age.

T.E. Lawrence did what any intelligent person facing long odds would do: he changed the paradigm under which he was operating. It’s what the Viet Cong did to the U.S. Army, what David did to Goliath, and what Digger Phelps and Fordham did to Doctor J. and the University of Massachusetts. One of Gladwell’s arbitrary set of examples that is appropriate is Tibco software because that company understood that they needed real-time information and accurate analysis to surpass larger competitors.

If a “skilled” youth team executes at an acceptable level, full-court pressure will bedevil their players. If a team executes at an elite level, they will pick full-court pressure apart. There is a reason that the favourite in war wins 71.5%. The underdogs don’t win because they are better at war but because they change the particular type of war that is being fought (which is exactly what anyone who is short-stacked should do).

Gladwell acknowledges this fact in effect on page two of the article but continues with another seven pages of dilatory, pedantic, and superficial logic. He is right about one statement: need fuels innovation and dire need accelerates the creative process.

The article discusses two possible outcomes for a mismatch: the underdog changes the game and prevails or favourite crushes them. It’s incredibly rare that the underdog does not alter the conditions of the battle and prevails (prevailing only due to luck, perhaps). Princeton didn’t try to beat Georgetown in the paint in 1989, they tried to cut and pass around them.

If a Major League pitcher has a great fastball but poor control, the batter should make him throw strikes or wait for his pitch. If the pitcher has a great fastball and precise control, their talent will overcome the batter (except for the element of chance, such as when Kirk Gibson took Dennis Eckersley long).

Pressure has its place, at the right time, in the right situation, and against the right opponent. Against the tremendous talent of the superior talent of teams such as the Chicago Bulls and the Boston Celtics, Rick Pitino won only one playoff series during his Association coaching career. Michael Jordan (1989) and Larry Bird (1988) picked his team - the New York Knicks - apart.

"This Is Russia”

Dave King wrote King of Russia during the 2004-05 season when he coached Metallurg Magnitogorsk of the Russian Super League. The diary contrasts the professional hockey systems in Russia and North America and records observations about daily life in Russia. In post-Communist Russia, the country is modernizing from Moscow outwards but it is not quite there. Despite all best intentions, transportation and distributions quandaries occasionally arise and corruption remains a problem. King encounters some bizarre situations where it is best not to ask questions because “this is Russia.” Unfortunately, King is also able to chronicle how the Russian economy is distilling into two classes: the very rich and the destitute (a problem occurring in other cities and countries, including Toronto).

King often admires the work ethic of players at all levels of the club program (echoing Gladwell’s 10,000 horus theory) and the Russian/Soviet ability to mesh different sport tactics and training methods together in order to better their teams (Lloyd Percival’s The Hockey Handbook receives a shout-out). Russian players work on physical conditioning (especially quadriceps muscles) from a very young age and skill is developed over thousands of repetitions. An hour practice might be divided into only three drills. Despite this work ethic, King finds that the team finally hits its stride after Russians with N.H.L. experience model the way and lead by example on the ice.

Questions abound at first about how the Canadian will survive in the Super League but King successfully introduces North American ideas such as power-plays and penalty killing systems and line match-ups. Even in the K-League there is not a single answer to every problem.

Outliers

Like Blink and The Tipping Point, Malcolm Gladwell weaves a number of seemingly unrelated pieces of anecdotal evidence to create his latest work Outliers. The fundamental premise of the book is that conventional wisdom about success is flawed: factors publically praised are irrelevant and success or failure can be determined by a few core factors.

Gladwell raises a salient point that many of athletic and academic cut-off dates favour those born early in the year. Basketball Ontario and other organizations have realized this and have implemented strategies to provide more coaching for those born late in the year and recognize reliable indicators of talent not based on age. The author also mentions that nobody reaches a gifted level unless they put in ten thousand hours of practice. Then Gladwell talks about the nebulous nature of opportunity and how many diligent workers never receive a key chance to succeed.

The final half of the book includes a half-baked chapter about how Southerners may have short tempers and self-control may be passed down through the family like speech tendencies. Apparently, communication errors cause most plane crashes and the clarity in the relationship between supervisor and subordinate depends on culture. Lastly, it is argued that Asians perform better at math because of a more logical naming system for their digits and more hours of schooling.

Some of these points seem sensible when explained, even though they may be superficially counterintuitive. The problem with picking evidence in order to create an entertaining, quirky book is that sample size is very small. Gladwell interviews a partner at the firm who is his literary agent; many of the examples are not arbitrarily selected. The first hundred pages are more solid than what follows - which is highly inconsistent - and relevant for coaches and player development. The rest of the book is largely for entertainment only and does not absolutely prove the thesis it set out to establish.

Freakonomics

Freakonomics by Steven D. Levitt interesting book for the guy who likes to generate “controversial” discussions at parties. So sumo wrestlers cheat, drug dealers live with their parents, and real estate agents receive a higher closing price when they sell a house that they own themselves. OK. Steven Levitt delivers his arguments in a light, easy to read, slightly esoteric format.

The economics are sound. Basically the pretence is that every individual is interested in maximising their utility. OK.

The most contentious chapter concerns Levitt’s belief that the decline of the crime rate in the late 1990s was caused by the legalisation of abortion in the 1970s. As a result of Roe v. Wade, indigent women who would have otherwise brought a hardened criminal into the world received abortions. However, I feel that the issue is far more complex and involves multiple factors.

It’s sort of like that TV show where the dude finds a briefcase containing details of his imminent death and attempts to change the future. Is changing his behaviour enough to cheat death or did he die because of the actions he took in light of this new information?

Levitt makes a very solid statement that incentives drive behaviour. I definitely agree; the world is comprised of choices and consequences. Levitt’s point is similar to Choice Theory: individuals choose to behave the way they do because this behaviour fills a need. People are responsible for their actions because they responded to an incentive and chose to maximise their utility.

(On that note, why don’t we teach more decision-making in schools?)

I believe that intrinsic motivation is much more powerful than extrinsic motivation. Coaches steer the ship but if the players believe personally in the ship’s direction, much less short-term coaching is required. According to Levitt and Choice Theory, coaches must create meaningful incentives to engineer the actions they desire. Every student-athlete is an individual and this is easier said than done.