Malcolm Gladwell and Full-Court Pressure

A friend asked me to comment on this article, which was published by Malcolm Gladwell in the New Yorker.

First of all, Vivek Ranadivé is incredibly self-centered and should reevaluate why he wants to coach twelve-year-old girls. This statement does not absolve his counterparts of their boorish, loutish, and short-tempered behaviour but he is coaching at the wrong level. Usually, that particular age group restricts full-court pressure because of the destructive effects on skill development. If he had limited practice time, Randivé should have focused on fundamental skills.
Obviously full-court pressure would work; most teenagers make horrendous decisions under any type of pressure. It’s entirely different when rick Pitino does likewise at the University of Louisville because of the difference in skill level and age.

T.E. Lawrence did what any intelligent person facing long odds would do: he changed the paradigm under which he was operating. It’s what the Viet Cong did to the U.S. Army, what David did to Goliath, and what Digger Phelps and Fordham did to Doctor J. and the University of Massachusetts. One of Gladwell’s arbitrary set of examples that is appropriate is Tibco software because that company understood that they needed real-time information and accurate analysis to surpass larger competitors.

If a “skilled” youth team executes at an acceptable level, full-court pressure will bedevil their players. If a team executes at an elite level, they will pick full-court pressure apart. There is a reason that the favourite in war wins 71.5%. The underdogs don’t win because they are better at war but because they change the particular type of war that is being fought (which is exactly what anyone who is short-stacked should do).

Gladwell acknowledges this fact in effect on page two of the article but continues with another seven pages of dilatory, pedantic, and superficial logic. He is right about one statement: need fuels innovation and dire need accelerates the creative process.

The article discusses two possible outcomes for a mismatch: the underdog changes the game and prevails or favourite crushes them. It’s incredibly rare that the underdog does not alter the conditions of the battle and prevails (prevailing only due to luck, perhaps). Princeton didn’t try to beat Georgetown in the paint in 1989, they tried to cut and pass around them.

If a Major League pitcher has a great fastball but poor control, the batter should make him throw strikes or wait for his pitch. If the pitcher has a great fastball and precise control, their talent will overcome the batter (except for the element of chance, such as when Kirk Gibson took Dennis Eckersley long).

Pressure has its place, at the right time, in the right situation, and against the right opponent. Against the tremendous talent of the superior talent of teams such as the Chicago Bulls and the Boston Celtics, Rick Pitino won only one playoff series during his Association coaching career. Michael Jordan (1989) and Larry Bird (1988) picked his team - the New York Knicks - apart.

The Best and Brightest

“Those who do not read history are doomed to repeat it,” according to George Santayana. According to David Halberstam’s book, The Best and the Brightest - which exposes how the Kennedy and Johnson cabinets of the 1960s handled Vietnam - it may not be so simple. John F. Kennedy’s administration had lofty goals: some of the most educated men in the country sought to redefine the role of the United States on the world stage. Some sought to curtail the arms race, others sought to establish a new, modern “Great Society” back home. Despite their best intentions and their amazingly bright minds, they failed miserably. Although the scholars had many good ideas, they lacked the aptitudes to implement them properly.

“The charts look good,” said Walt Rostow, National Security Advisor to Lyndon B. Johnson, in 1967. Yet despite that claim, the situation in Vietnam was worsening. Those making decisions didn’t have the proper statistics and consequently made incorrect choices. Many Far East experts had been purged from the State department and few individuals with experience in Southeast Asia remained to analyze the events.

Some information was false due to incompetence, other information ignored because decisions makers didn’t want to acknowledge what was happening. The United States viewed the war quantitively (believing their shear numbers advantage would win), rather than qualitively (and acknowledge that the Viet Cong was employing a different type of warfare). Some information was even falsified in order to avoid excessive media coverage. Ironically, when Johnson’s team lied about the true cost of the war, it wasn’t that the country couldn’t afford the higher figure but the fact that he had lie that helped bring him down.

“He’s my intellectual,” said Johnson about Rostow. Johnson was somewhat paranoid about Kennedy’s appointees and how they treated him. Advisors were hired based on the opinions, not their ability to understand a situation. Robert McNamara, the Secretary of Defense, was fired because he opposed an escalation of the bombing in North Vietnam. Aides were reluctant to bring their superiors information that might seem negative or pessimistic.

Throughout the administration, there was widespread refusal to admit wrong and accept weaknesses. Once the conflict escalated, the United States felt reluctant to withdraw because they didn’t want the world to think they were conceding defeat to a Communist country. There was also a reluctance to change and alter a course of action once it had been understand.

To me, a surprising fact was that many of the cabinet came from families that had advised the president a generation before (and some families continued to advise a generation later). Although they claimed not to be political, personal grudges and mistrust permeated the administration.

“The only difference between the Kennedy assassination and mine is that I am alive and it has been more tortuous,” complained Johnson during the 1968 primary season. Halberstam has written a detailed history of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. The book covers how people achieved their positions at the time and what happened after it all fell apart. It was not one decision that led to the disaster in Vietnam but many small choices, some made repeatedly.

“All men dream; but not equally. Those who dream by night in the dusty recesses of their minds Awake to find that it was vanity; But the dreamers of day are dangerous men. That they may act their dreams with open eyes to make it possible,” recited T.E. Lawrence after World War I. The 660 page chronicle is incredibly fascinating and sometimes depressing. Any leader can learn from this text and improve themselves and their team. Any person could read this, or Lawrence’s Seven Pillars of Wisdom, and wonder how the same mistakes are made over and over again, even today.