The More Things Change...

San Antonio beat Dallas 97-94 last week. Same as usual (except for 2006). Tim Duncan scored the crucial points while Dirk Nowitzki fell short at crunch time. Each team demonstrated how the keys to success lie in the details.

During the penultimate play, Bruce Bowen blocked Jason Terry’s shot. Duncan immediately took the ball out of bounds because he is the Spurs’ worst free throw shooter. He inbounded as soon as possible and since the Mavericks were ill-prepared, more time elapsed and San Antonio had the best chance for points from the line.

Bowen deliberately missed the second shot with 0.4 seconds remaining and Duncan tipped the ball towards midcourt. This action started the clock and increased the time it would take to recover the ball so the concept could have been just as effective had more time been on the clock.

Not all was well-executed by the defending champions. Michael Finley overran a hot closeout, permitting Josh Howard to drive by him and dunk before help arrived. Duncan changed his pivot foot in the paint but a foul was called due to his reputation. Bowen climbed all over Terry but the official passed.

Dallas still shows many of the same flaws. When Tony Parker guard Nowitzki on a switch, Dallas’ star forward did not back down San Antonio’s point guard and post him up. Instead, Nowitzki shot a contested a fade-away jumper with a low chance of success. Dallas still lacks crunch-time shooters and needed to bench newly-acquired Jason Kidd in order to put more scorers on the court.

I don’t blame Avery Johnson for this game but it is clear that he still stands in Pop’s shadow. San Antonio knew exactly what they wanted to do and executed each play fairly well. On the other side, it seems like nobody on the Dallas team wants to take responsibility for making plays in critical situation. Despite ostensibly improving their team, the Mavericks have fallen from first overall to a fifth or sixth place team and can look forward to another long off-season.

On the subject of Phoenix and San Antonio’s Game 5, Specifically

Bruce Bowen Drills Baseline Threes: So do Morris Peterson, Joe Johnson, and Donyell Marshall. Given how awkward Bowen is from the wing or the top of the key, he must shoot very well from corner in order to maintain his 38% overall three point percentage. In fact, the baseline three Bowen attempted in the last minute of Game 5 provided the Spurs with a higher expected point value (1.26) than had any of the other four players on the court attempted a two-point field goal (1.04).

Mike D’Antoni Occasionally Mismanages His Rotation: The Suns largely played six players, in light of the suspensions to Amare Stoudemire and Boris Diaw. Defensively, Phoenix conceded some open looks or fouled unnecessarily. Offensively, there were some atrocious possessions were Steve Nash dribbled endlessly into the defence while shooters and cutters stood still. At both ends of the court, it seems like fatigue contributed to questionable decisions.

The go-ahead three-pointer succeeded because San Antonio moved the ball away from the defence and Nash could not get to Bowen in time. I propose that if the Suns had played a deeper rotation, using Marcus Banks to spell the guards briefly and Jalen Rose to carry some of the scoring load, they would have had more energy for defence during the Spurs decisive run

The Suns Work Very Hard on Defence but their Execution Is Sometimes Lacking: Phoenix should have doubled the post entry to Tim Duncan and left Tony Parker open outside the arc, as they did. Parker was the best option out of a set of bad choices for the Suns: Manu Ginobli was en fuego, Michael Finley was draining shots from the line of 45º - when he passed on his shot, he was swinging it swiftly to Bowen in the corner - and Duncan and Parker were consistent as usual.

Why did Leandro Barbosa make such a looping turn after the ball left the double-team? The fastest guy on the court could only recover to Parker and box him out in the Russian Spot during the shot. Maybe he could have reached Bowen if he had more energy. How did James Jones, guarding Finley, get awkwardly tangled up in the strong-side with Barbosa? If Raja Bell and Nash had not played 47 and 46 minutes respectively, could they have run and jumped Parker’s penetration better? Could Nash have closed out Bowen effectively with fresher legs?

It will never be known whether the Suns too tired to close out correctly down the stretch or if they were unaware of where the San Antonio threats were positioned during the critical play.

It’s Important to Mentally Prepare for End-Game Situations: D’Antoni should have given more thought to the rotation after the initial double. It was highly probable that Parker would penetrate after receiving the pass. Had Bell plugged the foul line, Nash quickly stepped up to Ginobli, and Barbosa switched to Bowen, I think they could have prevented Parker from getting to the rim, Ginobli and Finley from shooting, and gotten to Bowen in time to change his shot, Barbosa’s physical limitations aside.

Many complicated issues would have arisen. Shawn Marion would have probably bared the onus of stopping Duncan one-on-one in a low shot clock situation. Duncan tough to stop on the block and may have gone to the line. All five Suns would have to box out. All things considered, I think that that scenario yields an expected point value of 1.02, although that figure is more art than science.

Don’t Go Small(er)

I’ve heard that the Phoenix Suns will adjust to the suspensions of Amare Stoudemire and Boris Diaw with a very small starting line-up (Nash, Bell, Barbosa, Ja. Jones, and Marion) for Game 5. I think this would be disastrous for a number of reasons and feel they should use some of their bigger players (Thomas and Rose) instead.

Bench Scoring: If the best sixth man in the Association starts, Phoenix will not have any players remaining to provide a scoring lift off the bench. I’ve always felt that Leandro Barbosa is most effective as a reserve, although he has started in pressure situations and performed admirably.

This is the type of game where Jalen Rose could contribute by scoring, like Tim Thomas did last year. Like Tim Thomas, Rose can’t guard anyone but Phoenix’s success is contingent on playing at their tempo - a variable that is even more critical tonight - so some sacrifices can be made at the defensive end in order to maintain their points-per-possession.

Post Defence: Kurt Thomas is the Suns’ best hope of stopping Tim Duncan, who will go off for forty and twenty if covered by Shawn Marion. Furthermore, Marion will be in foul trouble throughout the game, Duncan will find cutters and shooters like he did during Game 4’s third quarter, and the defensive rotation will still be slow as molasses (due to a lack of anticipation among inexperienced players).

Covering Duncan with Thomas and mixing traps and double-teams when San Antonio penetrates with the dribble or enters the ball into the post is the best course of action. Multiple defenses have kept the Spurs off-balance and there will be an opportunity to play some zone. If Mike D’Antoni doesn’t keep two forwards on the court, Fabricio Oberto will also hurt them with an efficient contribution.

Offensive Execution: Sparing Marion the defensive assignment of Duncan will save his energy for the offensive end. A two-man game with Steve Nash should be the primary focus of Phoenix’s offense. The Suns must attack the basket - the officials will give them the benefit of the doubt due to the controversy - in order to take high percentage shots and put the Spurs in foul trouble. Bell, Barbosa, and Jones will have plenty of time to shoot when the defence collapses but outside shooting should not be a primary goal.

Kurt Thomas screens and rolls well with Nash. Nash will have to hit his pull-up jumper with a good percentage in case he can’t get to the rack and Thomas must make Duncan, Oberto, and Bowen pay if they don’t step out to guard his shot.

A Basketball Rant

On Friday night, my friend accused me of going on a “basketball rant”. I was only responding to his questions about the Pistons, Spurs, and Suns so he could have stopped me at any time by stopping his questions.

Those three teams are arguably the three best in the Association. My friend’s point was that they more or less play a motion offence with a few exceptions.

Recently, Phoenix has been using this “diamond set” often, signalled by Mike D’Antoni, in addition to their transition and pick and roll games. The “diamond set” gives Steve Nash some options by setting ballscreens (do not go under the screen -- the Timberwolves hedged with Kevin Garnett, an excellent option for teams with athletic seven foot tall players). Detroit has their Circle Play for Rip Hamilton and San Antonio has been running a lot of side screen and rolls with Tim Duncan and Tony Parker.

Tony Parker has been very effective lately. His high shooting percentage makes him one of the most effective point guards in the world. Apparently, he devotes significant time to practicing the difficult shots that he attempts in the paint.

Since these three teams have talent, they don’t need as many plays. They can set their three core players (Detroit: Billups, Hamilton, Prince/Wallace; San Antonio: Duncan, Ginobli, Parker; Phoenix: Nash, Marion, Diaw) in a triangle and let them play. Since they have excellent supporting casts, defences must respect the shooters (R. Wallace, Finley, Jones).

Chris Bosh has been as effective as Tim Duncan recently. Bosh is playing a lot of minutes and taking a lot of shots. However, he’s making a good percentage and getting to the line often. Duncan has been awful from the line lately, which drags down his effective field goal percentage.